Ukraine war: away from the battlefield the diplomatic wrangling hots up with Modi visit to Kyiv

Ukraine’s three-week incursion has been countered recently by an intensifying Russian drone campaign against Ukrainian infrastructure. Russian troops have also made steady gains in the battle for the strategic logistics hub of Pokrovsk in the Donbas region in eastern Ukraine.

Meanwhile, in the background, the diplomatic wrangling in the more than 30-month-long war has also increased. But there’s no sign of a breakthrough or an indication that we might be seeing peace negotiations any time soon. 

On the Russian side, a three-day visit by Chinese premier Li Qiang, starting on August 21, was the highest profile such engagement since the presidential summit between the Chinese and Russian leaders, Xi Jinping and Vladimir Putin, in Beijing in May. Li then went on to Minsk for meetings with the Belarusian president, Alexander Lukashenko, and the country’s prime minister, Roman Golovchenko. Little of substance was discussed beyond declarations of intent about further strengthening ties and maintaining high levels of cooperation. But the meetings sent a clear signal of continuing Chinese support to Russia and its ally Belarus.

This signal was reinforced a day after Li’s departure for Minsk when a high-level Chinese military delegation, led by the commander of the ground forces of the Chinese army, Li Qiaoming, arrived in Moscow for talks with Russia’s deputy defence minister, Alexander Fomin. According to the Russian defence ministry, the two sides “reached agreements during the meeting on further enhancing cooperation between the ground forces in various spheres”.

Modi manoeuvring

While Li was shuttling from Moscow to Minsk, India’s prime minister, Narendra Modi, arrived in Kyiv on August 23. Modi is the first Indian head of state to visit since Ukraine’s independence more than 30 years ago. It’s particularly significant for Ukraine because of India’s complex relationships with Moscow, Beijing and the west, and its traditional role as power broker with considerable influence in the developing world.

In July, Modi made the first foreign trip of his third term as prime minister to Moscow, trying to shore up relations with India’s long-term ally Russia. Modi’s visit to Moscow was badly received in Ukraine and among India’s partners in the west.

But Modi’s recent trip to Kyiv suggests that neither is all well in the China-led pro-Russian camp. Before visiting Moscow, Modi had skipped the summit of the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO) on July 3-4 in Astana, Kazakhstan. This has partly to do with continuing border tensions between Beijing and New Delhi. The ever-closer relationship between Moscow and Beijing probably deprives India of a traditional ally in its rivalry with China, and – equally worrying for New Delhi – Pakistan.

India may now be Russia’s largest oil buyer, but the country is reducing its military dependence on Russia by diversifying its supplies of arms. This has gone hand in hand with strengthened ties between India, the US, Japan and Australia in the so-called Quad. The Quad is an important component in Washington’s efforts to counter China in the Indo-Pacific, including efforts to pull India away from Chinese-led blocs such as the SCO and the Brics group of emerging economies.

To be clear, Modi has so far refused to condemn Russia’s aggression against Ukraine. And he has not yet endorsed Zelensky’s peace formula for an end to the war. But, while India did not sign up to the final communique of Zelensky’s “Summit on Peace in Ukraine” in Switzerland three months ago, at least it sent a delegation, headed by the deputy national security adviser, Pavan Kapoor.

During his visit to Kyiv, Modi reiterated the need for dialogue to end the war and offered his help to initiate peace talks. Zelensky, meanwhile, expressed his support for the idea of India hosting a follow up to the summit in Switzerland.

Recent events may not put India firmly in the camp of Ukraine’s pro-western backers, but the visit sends an important signal that New Delhi is probably less committed to endorsing Russia’s and China’s views on the war. Given India’s traditionally influential role in the global south, it could also help Ukraine build support among countries there that have been particularly badly affected by rising food, fertiliser and energy prices as a result of the war in Ukraine.

Ukraine, meanwhile, also scored several points in relations with its western allies. On August 23, US president Joe Biden announced a new military aid package worth US$125 million (£95 million). This primarily aims to bolster Ukraine’s air defences and to top up Kyiv’s supplies of ammunition for the ground war.

On the same day, the US also imposed new sanctions against some 400 companies and individuals. While this group includes a large number of Chinese entities accused of supporting the Russian war effort through the export of dual-use goods. In keeping with efforts to pull India further away from Russia and China, no Indians have been sanctioned.

Given the track record of sanctions so far, it’s unlikely to deal a knock-out blow to the Russian economy. Neither will it persuade Beijing to back away from Moscow in any substantial way. But it is likely to feature prominently on the agenda of White House national security adviser Jake Sullivan’s visit to China at the end of August.

Taken together, neither Kyiv nor Moscow have made any earth-shattering recent gains or losses on the diplomatic front. But the careful manoeuvring by India also suggests that things remain in flux as all sides and their backers try to shore up support on the international stage. If nothing else, it does indicate that they all think that there is still much to play for – on and off the battlefield.

Stefan Wolff, Professor of International Security, University of Birmingham

This article is republished from The Conversation under a Creative Commons license. Read the original article.