How Vladimir Putin was able to change Russia’s constitution and become ‘president for life’

At some point during a political leader’s final term they start to become prey to what is commonly known as “lame duck syndrome”. Donald Trump may have only just been inaugurated, but political commentators are already saying this is likely to happen in a couple of years, once the mid-term elections have been contested in 2026.

If that happens, he could, at least in part, be guided by the way Vladimir Putin dealt with his own looming term-limit problem following his election for a fourth term as Russian president in 2018. Of course, the US is not Russia – and, despite legitimate criticisms about how US democracy works, the US is a genuine democracy. It would be extremely difficult for Trump to achieve an amendment to term limits.

In contrast, the Russian Federation has been referred to as an “imitation democracy”. It has institutions that one would find in democratic systems of government (a parliament and a directly elected president). But, among other flaws, these institutions do not function within a genuinely competitive or fair electoral environment.

In March 2018, Putin embarked upon his last constitutionally permitted, second successive term in office. This gave rise to what became known as the “2024 problem” because he would not, in principle, be able to stand for the presidency again in 2024. Without an amendment to the Russian Constitution, by virtue of Article 81(3), Putin would have to leave office in 2024.

Previously after he had served two four-year terms, in 2008, Putin avoided the practical consequence of the rule by becoming prime minister. For the next four years his ally Dmitry Medvedev occupied the Russian presidency, while Putin sat in as prime minister before returning to office in 2012. By this stage presidential term limits in Russia had been lengthened from four years to six. The question on many minds between 2018 and 2019 was how Putin would address the issue of his final term of office when it ended in 2024.

Elite interventions

Putin won his fourth presidential election in March 2018. Between that moment and his announcement in January 2020 that he was initiating a process of constitutional reform, an increasing number of the well-connected members of the political elite were publicly discussing the prospect of such reform.

A review of the data for the period 2016 to 2018 in a selection of Kremlin-friendly media indicates that there were just two comments in those publications on constitutional amendment between March 2016 and February 2018 relating to members of the connected elite. But between March 2018 and December 2019, this number rose markedly – to 37.

An intervention from the president of the constitutional court, Valery Zorkin, in the form of an article in the state-owned Rossiyskaya Gazeta tentatively started the debate under the headline: Deficiencies in the Constitution can be eliminated through targeted changes.

This prompted various prominent Duma members to speak up about the benefits of reform. These included the speaker of the lower house, Vyacheslav Volodin, his Senate counterpart, Valentina Matvienko and Medvedev, at that stage the prime minister. Medvedev took to the social media site Vkontakte to note that “society and the political system are developing, and this may raise questions about fine-tuning the functioning of individual government institutions”.

Not all of these interventions were wholly in favour of constitutional amendment. But there are three things worth noting.

First, that the catalyst for discussion about constitutional amendment was most likely the fact of the looming term limit. Second, this clustering of elite interventions meant that the ground was being laid for continuing and increasing dialogue. Third, the Kremlin neither endorsed nor ignored these statements – it acknowledged them but passed little comment on their merits.

It was rare for Putin to say anything during this period. His spokesman, Dmitry Peskov, was never entirely dismissive of the public debate relating to the constitution but adopted Putin’s initial line, namely that there were no current plans for amendment. However, he consistently left open the prospect of giving further thought to proposals from people such as Volodin.

It is most likely that the Kremlin was adopting a wait-and-see approach. In the meantime, Putin wasn’t visibly seen to be directly manoeuvring to change the constitution for his own benefit.

Putin makes his move

The Russian president announced the plan for constitutional reform in his speech to both houses of the federal assembly on January 15 2020. Drawing in part on the interventions of Zorkin and Volodin, the focus of his comments on reform was actually on improving checks and balances – including, for example, through appointment of heads of security services in consultation with the parliament.

However, through the introduction of a late amendment by the first woman in space – and Duma deputy – Valentina Tereshkova, the aim of the project became “zeroing” Putin’s presidential terms, effectively erasing the fact that he had already served multiple terms. Despite amending the constitution so that no president could serve more than two terms in total, it meant Putin could now serve a further two terms, leaving the route open to stay in power until 2036. Putin presented this reform as something that had been demanded from below.

In principle, Trump faces a similar problem to that which Putin encountered in 2018. At some point during his second term he too will suffer from the threat of being a lame duck. He has a “2028 problem”. Will he look to constitutional amendment as a means of keeping the dream of political power alive, even if he is ultimately unsuccessful?

If we begin to see similar interventions from Trump supporters, perhaps discussing the shortcomings of term limits (especially in circumstances where Trump’s tenure was interrupted by Joe Biden’s four-year presidency), this could be a sign of Trump’s next steps.

Paul Edward Fisher, Lawyer/PhD Candidate, UCL

This article is republished from The Conversation under a Creative Commons license. Read the original article.